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Why do similarly sized peacekeeping missions vary in their effectiveness to protect 
civilians in conflicts? We argue that peace operations with a large share of troops from 
countries with high-quality militaries are better able to deter violence from state and 
non-state actors, create buffer zones within conflict areas, can better reach remote 
locations, and have superior capabilities²including diplomatic pressure by troop 
contributing countries²to monitor the implementation of peace agreements. These 
operational advantages enable them to better protect civilians. Combining data from 
military expenditures of troop contributing countries together with monthly data on the 
composition of peace operations, we create a proxy indicator for the average troop 
quality of UN PKOs. Statistical evidence from an extended sample of conflicts in 
Africa and Asia between 1991 and 2010 supports our argument.  
Keywords: Peacekeeping, troop quality, protection of civilians, troop contributions 
Corresponding author: felix.haass@giga-hamburg.de 
  







Do peacekeeping operations (PKOs) with well-trained troops and advanced military hardware 
better protect civilians from violence in armed conflicts than ill-equipped deployments? Or is 
it only troop size and mission diversity that shape D3.2¶VDELOLW\to reduce violence against 
civilians (Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013; Bove & Ruggeri, 2016)? The cases of the 
Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali illustrate these questions well: Despite the presence 
of over 9,000 troops in the CAR in September 2015, the Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) failed to contain the 
killing of 75 civilians in September of the same year. Amnesty International (AI) reports 
that²in addition to an extremely difficult political situation in the country²major gaps in 
training and equipment of the peacekeepers from, inter alia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Mali, Vietnam, or YemeQVLJQLILFDQWO\FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHPLVVLRQ¶VIDLOXUH$,
quotes a MINU6&$IRUFHVWDIIREVHUYLQJWKDWµ[w]hen WKHUH¶VJXQILUHZHFDQRQO\VHQGWKH
JX\VLQDUPRUHGYHKLFOHV%XWVHYHUDORIWKHVHDUHFXUUHQWO\RXWRIVHUYLFH>«@7KLVUHGXFHs 
our capacity oILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ (Amnesty International, 2016: 18).  
Contrast this with the peacekeeping mission in Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that was established in April 2013. 
Despite a mission strength that was significantly lower at the time that of MINUSCA (about 
5,000 troops in August 2013) in a country about twice the size of the CAR, the UN operation 
successfully stabilized the situation in Mali and monitored the presidential elections in August 
2013. MINUSMA was in a much better position to respond to threats against civilians than 
MINUSCA, in part due to the fact that the mission consisted, inter alia, of highly trained 
troops from the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Finland, and included sufficient transport 






vehicles.1 This logistical advantage²together with the diplomatic support that accompanied 
the troops from Western contributors²enabled MINUSMA to effectively stabilize the 
country and monitor the political situation around the 2013 elections. 
Previous studies largely agree that UN peacekeeping has a positive effect on the reduction of 
violence both in terms of battle-deaths and civilian killings. Findings differ, however, in the 
explanations offered for a reduction of casualties, pointing towards mission size (Fortna, 
2008; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013), type of mission (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; 
Hultman, 2010) or mission diversity (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016). We agree with existing 
research that troop size and mission diversity can reduce violence against civilians. We argue, 
however, that mission-OHYHOYDULDWLRQLQD8QLWHG1DWLRQV81PLVVLRQ¶VWURRSquality has an 
independent and empirically observable negative effect on one-sided violence. Focusing on 
troop quality in this way helps to explain the question of mismatch between the numbers of 
troops deployed and mission effectiveness.  
Higher quality peacekeepers are better equipped and trained to create buffer zones between 
combatants and to monitor ceasefires and peace agreements. Together, deterrence, buffer 
zones and better monitoring, including better intelligence and diplomatic pressure, raise the 
costs of one-sided violence and lower its benefits to both rebels and governments, ultimately 
reducing rebels¶ and government¶s targeting of civilians. Using military expenditure data 
from troop contributing countries (TCCs) to UN peace operations, we find empirical support 
for this argument in an extended sample of 70 intrastate conflict episodes in Africa and Asia 
between 1991 and 2010.  
A number of factors could make this relationship between troop quality and the protection of 
civilians a spurious one. Former colonial powers, such as France or the United Kingdom 
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 Both countries also saw a military intervention by France ± Operation Serval in Mali, Operation Sangaris in the 
CAR ± which contributed to a stabilisation of the countries alongside the peacekeeping missions. 






(UK), systematically deploy troops to UN missions in their former colonies. Other countries 
with more advanced military equipment, such as Germany or Japan, have traditionally been 
risk-averse when it comes to UN peace operations. Other variables that could bias our results 
are the general political willingness of contributing countries to deploy troops, as well as 
training and organization of forces (Tellis et al., 2000: 143ff.; Brooks & Stanley, 2007). To 
tackle these problems, we subject our main analysis to a series of robustness checks. We re-
estimate our models on a matched sample, with conflict-fixed and mission-specific fixed 
effects, as well as on a sample that includes only conflicts where peacekeepers were present. 
In addition, we estimate a wide range of model specifications that explicitly control for 
potential alternative explanations. Our results are robust to these empirical approaches, 
suggesting that they are not driven by selection effects. 
Our contribution to the debate on the protection of civilians by peacekeeping troops is 
twofold. First, we complement existing scholarship on peacekeeping operations by offering a 
more fine-grained explanation of their violence-reducing effect and to the question why large 
or diverse peacekeeping troops are not always able to prevent violence against civilians. 
Second, we introduce systematic quantitative evidence into a critical policy debate. 
Peacekeeping officials, think tanks and many troop contributing countries have long 
demanded that countries with more advanced military technology increase their contributions 
to UN peace operations (Smith & Boutellis, 2013; United Nations, 2015). We show that such 
an increase not only in numbers, but also improvements in mission quality have a 
substantively significant effect in reducing violence against civilians.  
Peacekeeping troop quality and violence against civilians 
Peacekeeping troop quality is defined as the technical and personal capability of a peace 
operation as well as its political support to fulfil its mandate independently of troop size. The 






technical and personal capability of a peacekeeping mission is largely a function of the quality 
of the troops from the troop contributing countries, including training as well as equipment 
such as weapons, battle dress, but also larger equipment such as helicopters, transport planes, 
or military vehicles (Daniel, 2008).2 Political support refers to the TCC¶s diplomatic bilateral 
and multilateral engagement in the mission country alongside the deployment of its troops, 
which is dependent on a number of factors such as security threats towards the TCC, risk 
averseness or membership in the UN Security Council (Tellis et al., 2000, Ch. 7; Brooks & 
Stanley, 2007).3 Consequently, holding all other factors constant, the better the quality of each 
WURRS FRQWULEXWLQJ FRXQWU\¶V PLOLWDU\ GHSOR\PHQW WR D 81 SHDFHNHHSLQJ PLVVLRQ WKH EHWWHU
will be the overall troop quality of the peacekeeping mission. The overall troop quality of the 
mission is crucial for the prevention of one-sided violence against civilians.4 
One-sided violence is defined as µthe use of armed force by the government of a state or by a 
formally organized group against civilians¶ (Eck & Hultman, 2007: 235). Violence against 
civilians is a strategy by conflict parties to gain a better bargaining position (Eck & Hultman, 
2007) or to enforce collaboration and punish defection (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 
2004). One of the most important tasks of UN peacekeeping missions²besides the 
monitoring of ceasefires and implementation of peace agreement²is the protection of 
civilians and the reduction of one-sided violence (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009). We argue that 
peacekeeping missions with higher overall troop quality are better able to protect civilians 
because they are better equipped, both logistically and politically, to thwart the use of one-
sided violence by conflict parties. Specifically, high-quality troops are better able to deter 
                                                 
2
 We focus on contingent-owned equipment (COE), i.e. equipment and soldiers from the TCC. This type of 
equipment exists alongside mission-owned equipment. To ensure that our troop quality measure does not reflect 
mission expenditures, we also control for PKO expenditure in our robustness checks.  
3
 It does not include the mission¶s mandate, which we discuss separately below.  
4
 µ+ROGLQJDOORWKHUIDFWRUVFRQVWDQW¶LPSOLHVWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW7&&VDUHDOVRwilling to use higher quality 
troop commitments in PKOs. Empirically, there are exceptions to this. We therefore relax this assumption and 
address the question of whether some kind of TCCs (e.g. risk-averse or strategically-motivated TCCs) 
systematically commit and deploy troops to certain kinds of operations in the robustness checks section. 






violence from state and non-state actors, to create buffer zones between combatants, and to 
monitor ceasefires and peace agreements which raise the costs of one-sided violence and 
lower its benefits to both rebels and governments. 
First, high-quality peacekeeping missions can better deter conflict actors that target civilians 
than lower-quality missions. If we consider violence against civilians as a strategic action by 
conflict actors, better equipped peacekeeping missions are potentially more dangerous to 
conflict parties as they function as costly response to the targeting civilians by conflict parties. 
Thus, the potential of high-quality peacekeeping missions to deter attacks increases 
FRPEDWDQWV¶ FRVWV RI FLYLOLDQ YLFWLPL]DWLRQ WR D JUHDWHU H[WHQW WKDQ the responses of 
peacekeeping missions of lower quality. In February 2014 a review of the African 
Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), stated for instance that 
µVKRUWIDOOVLQWKHRSHUDWLRQDOFDSDELOLWLHVRIWKH0LVVLRQ¶VPLOLWDU\DQGSolice components [are 
a] key challenge to effective mandate implementation, particularly with respect to the 
protection of civilians and ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Those shortfalls 
VHULRXVO\ FRQVWUDLQ WKH IRUFH¶V PRELOLW\ HIIHFWLYHQHss and ability to deter attacks¶ (United 
Nations, 2014: 8, emphasis added). 
Second, high-quality missions are in a better position to create buffer zones between rebel 
groups and between combatants and civilians, because they are better able to respond to the 
logistical challenges posed by conflict-affected territories. Conflict countries typically suffer 
from enormous destruction of infrastructure. The main challenge peacekeepers face in such an 
environment is the logistics of moving troops in remote regions of the country. In the absence 
of functioning streets and railways, better military equipment such as transport helicopters or 
planes is essential to deploy peacekeepers even in remote areas (Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 
2016). Without such equipment, even nominally large peacekeeping operations will have 






difficulties in creating effective buffer zones between conflict parties that prevents them from 
targeting civilians. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is a case in point: Despite a 
mission size of over 12,000 armed peacekeepers, more than 100 civilians and four UN 
peacekeepers were killed in attacks between December 2013 and July 2016 (Patinkin, 2017). 
The lack of civilian protection was caused by the force being too stretched to patrol a country 
the size of France; hence it was not able to deploy to a rebel stronghold in the Northeast, 
where a government offensive had displaced thousands of civilians (ibid.). 
Third, high-quality peacekeeping troops are also in a better position to monitor conflict 
SDUWLHV¶ EHKDYLRU 7KLV LV HVSHFLDOO\ LPSRUWDQW ZKHQ WKH WDVNV RI WKH SHDFHNHHSLQJ PLVVLRQ
include the oversight of a ceasefire or peace agreement, when the process of keeping the 
peace and political negotiations towards a long-lasting solution go hand in hand. Better 
equipment, such as planes, satellite imagery, and radio equipment allows more effective 
reconnaissance, especially of remote areas, and thus better monitoring of combatants. The 
failure of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) in Angola 
highlights this point. Nicholas Howen, WKH PLVVLRQ¶V Human Rights Unit director, stated: 
µ81$9(0>,,,@¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHZDVSRRU&RPPXQLFDWLRQIORZVEHWZHHQWKHSURYLnces and its 
>«@ headquarters in Luanda were sporadic; liaison between different departments >«@ itself 
was often fragmented due to factionalism among staff and overly bureaucratic procedures¶ 
(cited in Guyot & Vines, 2015: 336). These operational difficulties contributed to the inability 
of the mission to uphold the ceasefire and both parties resumed violent campaigns against 
civilians shortly after. 
 
 










Another channel through which high-quality WURRSV LQFUHDVH D PLVVLRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR PRQLWRU
(and influence) combatant behavior is increased diplomatic pressure. A peacekeeping mission 
is often accompanied by a number of mediation and negotiation strategies that aim to increase 
the diplomatic pressure on the conflict parties. Troops in PKOs with higher quality equipment 
typically come from countries with higher military expenditures. Those countries which are 
willing and in the logistical position to deploy troops to a given conflict are often more 
willing to engage diplomatically to end the conflict (Camiña & Porteiro, 2009). For instance, 
the Lomé peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the rebel group RUF 
was signed after international pressure and sanctions by the UN and other actors such as the 
regional organisation ECOWAS (see UN Security Council resolution 1132). While it did not 
bring a final end to the violence, it paved the way for the settlement of the armed conflict.  
H: A UN peacekeeping operation with higher troop quality reduces the level of violence 
against civilians.  






Figure 1 summarizes our argument and the causal mechanisms. 
Data and research design 
To test our hypothesis, we quantitatively investigate the impact of peacekeeping troop quality 
on incidences and magnitude of one-sided violence. Starting point for our analysis are all 
intrastate conflicts between 1991 and 2010 captured by version 1.9 of the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED) (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). To 
be included in the GED dataset, a conflict must have exceeded 25 battle-related deaths per 
year.5 The GED project further provides data oQ DOO WKUHH RI WKH 8&'3¶V FDWHJRULHV RI
organized violence: state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence. 
The last category allows us to combine information on armed conflict with incidences of one-
sided violence by the government, rebel groups, or both. Also, µthe theoretical processes 
associated with victimization may continue after the cessation of hostilities¶ (Hultman, 
Kathman & Shannon, 2013: 882). Thus, we add two years of observations to the end of each 
conflict episode. These selection criteria result in the inclusion of 70 conflict episodes in our 
dataset, 39 in Africa and 32 in Asia (see Appendix A). From this base sample we create a 
dataset with conflict-months as unit of observation.6 
Dependent variable: one-sided violence (OSV) 
We measure the protection of civilians as the monthly count of one-sided violence as reported 
by the GED dataset. In our mechanism analysis below, we distinguish between OSV 
conducted by rebels and OSV perpetrated by the government.   
 
                                                 
5
 We exclude Rwanda from our sample since the Rwandan genocide in 1994 constitutes a substantial outlier in 
the count of civilian deaths as a result of one-sided violence. 
6
 The dataset design follows Hultman et al. (2013), but on an updated sample built from the UCDP GED version 
1.9. GED 1.9 includes both a longer period of observation (until 2010, as opposed 2008) and a greater 
geographical scope (Africa plus South East Asia, as opposed to sub-Saharan Africa). 







Measuring UN peacekeeping troop quality  
We FRQVLGHU D 7&&¶V RYHUDOO PLOLWDU\ FDSDELOLWLHV DV D URXJK SUR[\ IRU WKH quality of its 
deployed peacekeeping troops. Specifically, we XVHD7&&¶V annual military expenditures in 
constant 2011 US dollars divided by the number of armed personnel (short: spending per 
capita) to operationalize its military capabilities.7 Similar to most of the existing literature, we 
use data from the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research (SIPRI)  (SIPRI, 2014) RQFRXQWULHV¶
military expenditures.8  
We are aware of the fact that military spending per capita is an imperfect measure of a 
country¶VPLOLWDU\FDSDELOLWLHV0LOLWDU\VSHQGLQJLVDQinput measure and capWXUHVDFRXQWU\¶V
willingness to spend money on its military. Military capabilities, on the other hand, are output 
measures. They denote a country¶V DELOLW\ WR WUDQVODWH LWV VSHQGLQJ LQWR PLOLWDU\ RXWFRPHV
Unfortunately, research lacks more detailed data on military capabilities and the translation of 
DFRXQWU\¶VLQSXWPHDVXUHs into actual military outcomes. Thus, expenditures are widely used 
in the literature as a proxy for military capabilities (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This shortcoming 
is particularly pronounced when it comes to capturing training quality. Yet we are optimistic 
that our measure also captures training quality, at least to some extent. First, our primary 
measure is calculated as expenditures per number of armed personnel. This normalization by 
army size takes into account that oversized militaries, for instanced due to conscription, might 
also imply higher overall spending. Second, our measure is calculated in constant 2011 USD. 
This accounts for purchasing power differences across countries, including differences in 
                                                 
7
 We also use total annual military spending (not normalized by military personnel) as well as spending as a 
share of GDP as a robustness check for the troop quality measure, which does not substantively alter our results. 
See Appendix D.2. 
8
 SIPRI (2015: n.p.) defines military expenditures as µall current and capital expenditure on the armed forces, 
including peace keeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; 
paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations; and military space 
activities¶ 






salaries (which could reflect training quality), albeit imperfectly.9 Finally, higher spending on 
equipment implies more complex machinery which, in turn, also requires better training to 
operate. Simply put, high expenditures on drones or surveillance equipment also require 
additional training. Thus, we are confident that our measure captures the training aspect of a 
FRXQWU\¶V military capability as well. 
We believe that D FRXQWU\¶V military spending positively correlates with the quality of a 
FRXQWU\¶VWURRSFRQWULEXWLRQV to a peacekeeping operation. Many Western countries that have 
high per-capita military spending rate compared to other militaries are also often very risk-
averse when it comes to their military deployments (Schörnig & Lembcke, 2006). 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ ZH FDQ DVVXPH WKDW WKHVH FRXQWULHV¶ PLOLWDU\ VSHQGLQJ WUDQVODWHV WR EHWWHU
equipment as well as diplomatic engagement with the mission country in order to protect their 
soldiers in the field ± and thus also their soldiers in peacekeeping operations. Even if 
countries systematically select the least-trained units and the worst maintained equipment as 
their contributions to peacekeeping operations higher levels of spending should also be 
associated with a better equipment of such contributions, on average. To corroborate this 
proposition, we exploit a dataset by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) (see 
Appendix E for details). The dataset contains information of the number of pieces of 
specialized equipment in UN peace operations, such as combat vehicles or transport 
helicopters for June 2014 (the only month for which data is available). We correlate our troop 
quality measure that is based on TCC military spending (see below) with the CICs recorded 
number of equipment pieces across different equipment types. We report a positive 
relationship between higher values of our mission-specific troop quality data and more 
                                                 
9
 Imperfection in measuring salary disparities across countries not only stems from differences in purchasing 
power parity (for which we account), but also from different relative costs between personnel and equipment (for 
which we cannot account). To put differently, the costs of machinery typically remain relatively constant (fighter 
jets are expensive everywhere) whereas it less expensive to train fighter pilots in some countries than others. 
There is a lack of data on relative personnel vs equipment spending, however, so that we cannot directly measure 
this.  






specialized pieces of equipment per mission. Despite this positive correlation, a number of 
factors can systematically influence which troops a country deploys to a mission (or if it 
deploys them at all). These factors include risk-aversion, strategic interests in the mission 
country, a culture of restrictive rules of engagement and others. We address these concerns in 
the robustness check section, particularly in Table D.1 in the Appendix.  
To translate individual TCC PLOLWDU\VSHQGLQJLQWRDPHDVXUHRIDSHDFHNHHSLQJRSHUDWLRQ¶V
troop quality, we exploit information about the size of its troop contributions to each mission. 
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides detailed data on these 
contributions on a monthly basis (Kathman, 2013; Perry & Smith, 2013). We use this 
information to construct a time-varying weighted average of military equipment for each 
mission-month for all missions in the data set, using the following formula: 
 ܶݎ݋݋݌ݍݑ݈ܽଓݐݕ௠௧തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത ൌ   ? ௦௣௘௡ௗ௜௡௚௣௘௥௖௔௣௜௧௔೔כ௧௥௢௢௣௦೔೙೔సభ  ? ௧௥௢௢௣௦೘೙೔సభ     (1)  
where for mission m in month t an average equipment is calculated for the sum of spending 
multiplied by troops for each country i, divided by the sum of all troops of the mission under 
consideration. Countries with less military spending will decrease the average measure of 
Troop Quality of the overall mission. By construction, countries with a higher number of 
troops will be given a higher weight in the quality measure than countries with a low number 
of troops. The following example illustrates the construction of our troop quality measure. 
Table I VKRZV WKH WURRS GHSOR\PHQWV WR WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 2SHUDWLRQ LQ &RWH G¶,YRLUH
812&, LQ $SULO  WRJHWKHU ZLWK HDFK FRXQWU\¶V PLOLWDU\ H[SHQGLWXUH SHU VROGLHU LQ
constant 2011 US dollars (in millions). The unweighted average of military spending for this 
mission-month is US$ 20.81m. We can see, however, that France has the highest military 
spending per soldier of all troop contributing countries for UNOCI in this month. The 
weighted mean of this mission-month, which explicitly takes into account this enormous 






contribution of troops by France, is US$ 28.53m²considerably higher than the simple 
mission mean of military spending per soldier.  
Table I. Troop contributions to UNOCI in April 2004 
 
 Calculations based on IPI data on troop contributions (Perry and Smith 2013) and SIPRI data on 





per soldier (in 
USD millions) 
France 182 185.83 
Brazil 1 35.65 
Russian Federation 2 30.56 
Uruguay 1 27.57 
Kenya 4 19.10 
China 2 16.93 
Romania 2 14.48 
India 4 13.05 
Ghana 260 11.33 
Benin 260 10.00 
Morocco 49 9.65 
Paraguay 1 8.42 
Senegal 237 8.06 
Burkina Faso 1 7.88 
Jordan 4 7.73 
Nigeria 3 7.24 
Pakistan 6 6.66 
Togo 231 5.22 
Niger 312 4.60 
Bangladesh 9 3.78 
Gambia 1 3.38 
Sum: 1572  
Weighted average:  28.53 







Figure 2. Troop quality, one-sided violence and troop strength of UNOCI 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship of this PKO troop quality measure with troop size, as well 
as civilian killings. The upper panel of Figure 2 displays the count of civilian killings in Cote 
G¶,YRLUH7KHVHFRQGSDQHOYLVXDOL]HVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI812&,¶V troop quality over time; 
the third panel shows the number of troops deployed to the country. Figure 2 indicates that 
)UDQFH¶VHDUO\FRQWULEXWLRQWR812&,OHGWRDVSLNHLQWKHPLVVLRQ¶VHTXLSPHQWPHDVXUHULJKW
after deployment. But the measure slowly declines as more troops from countries with lower 
military spending per soldier deploy troops to UNOCI, which pull the measure downwards. 
The plot also shows two other features of the data: First, it indicates that variation in troop 
quality is distinct from the actual number of troops on the ground. Indeed, the spike of 
812&,¶VWURRSquality is in March 2004 when only very few soldiers were actually deployed. 
The nominal mission strength increases while the troop quality declines. Second, one-sided 






violence seems indeed to be negatively correlated with an increase in troop quality, but also 
with an increase in troop strength. Visually, however, the effect is difficult to precisely 
disentangle from the effect of troop size. To separate out the effect of troop quality as opposed 
to troop strength we therefore turn to multivariate methods. 
Model and control variables 
Our empirical approach followV +XOWPDQ .DWKPDQ DQG 6KDQQRQ¶V 13) and Bove and 
5XJJHUL¶V) econometric strategy in estimating a model of the following form: 
ܱܵ ௜ܸ௧ ൌ ߟሺǤ ሻ ൌ ܶݎ݋݋݌ܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ܱܵ ௜ܸ௧ିଵ ൅  ߝ௜௧   (2) 
where the subscripts i and t refer to conflict id and month, respectively. ܱܵ ௜ܸ௧ denotes the 
total number of civilians killed in conflict-month it. ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜௧ିଵ is a measure of our troop 
quality proxy lagged by one month and ܱܵ ௜ܸ௧ିଵ is a lagged dependent dummy variable which 
takes 1 if in the previous month one-sided violence occurred and 0 if not in order to control 
for time dependency. ௜ܺ௧ is a matrix of peacekeeping mission-specific and conflict-specific 
control variables (see below). ߝ௜௧ is the month specific error term. ߟሺǤ ሻ refers to a negative 
binomial link function, since our dependent variable is a count variable. The negative 
binomial link function is a reasonable choice as it controls for heterogeneity and contagion in 
the data and allows our data to be highly overdispersed with variance not equal to the mean 
(Fox, 2008: 391ff). 
We follow Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) and Bove and Ruggeri (2015) by 
including the following PKO-specific and conflict-specific control variables in our basic 
specification: the lagged monthly number of troops, police, and military observers deployed 






to the conflict-month.10 Although Kathman (2013) provides comprehensive data on troop 
contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, we construct this measure using data from the 
International Peace Institute (Perry & Smith, 2013) which hand-coded the same data as 
Kathman (2013),3,¶VLQGHSHQGHQWFRGLQJRIWKHVDPHGDWDVRXUFHRI81WURRSFRQWULEXWLRQV
(i.e. monthly reports by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations) serves as an 
DGGLWLRQDOUREXVWQHVVFKHFNWR+XOWPDQHWDO¶VRULJLQDODSSURDFKZKLFKHPSOR\V.DWKPDQ¶V
data. 
We include the same conflict-specific control variables as Hultman et al. (2013). A measure 
of all battle-related deaths as captured by the UCDP GED data set (Sundberg & Melander, 
2013). Incompatibility is a dummy variable, indicating whether a conflict was fought over 
territory or government and is taken from UCDP (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2012). Finally we 
include conflict duration (measured in months since conflict onset) and population (logged), 
ZKLFK LVDFRXQWU\¶VSRSXODWLRQVL]H LQDJLYHQ\HDU (World Bank, 2015). The battle-deaths 
and the duration covariates explicitly allow us to control for potential adverse selection 
effects if troop contributing countries systematically shy away from particularly violent or 
long conflicts.  
Results and analysis 
We report the main results of our quantitative analysis of the effect of a PKO¶VWURRSquality 
on one-sided violence against civilians in Table II. Model 1 represents a baseline model, 
assessing the effect of troop quality on one-sided violence while controlling for a host of 
mission-specific and conflict-specific covariates. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the troop quality variable in Model 1 indicates that as the average spending per 
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 By construction, troop size and our measure of troop quality are correlated, since they can only occur together. 
This raises concerns about multicollinearity. However, correlation between both measures is weak (0.38) and 
variance inflation diagnostics for the models in Table II do not reveal any collinearity problems.  






soldier of troop contributing countries increases, the level of civilian killings declines. Note 
that the negative relationship between troop quality and one-sided violence persists even 
though we explicitly control for the number of troops on the ground. This supports our 
argument that troop quality has an effect that is independent of troop size. 
The coefficient for numbers of UN troops is negative and statistically significant across all 
models, which confirms the findings of previous research with our geographically extended 
dataset: an increased number of troops reduces violence against civilians. We do not find, 
however, the same negative and statistically significant effect of UN police on the reduction 
of one-sided violence as Hultman et al. Our findings for UN observers are similarly 
inconclusive across models. Our data suggest that only military troop, as well as a troop 
quality can lead to a reduction of violence against civilians.  
  






Table II. Effect of peacekeeping troop quality on violence against civilians 




Fixed effects  
(3) 
FE +  
Cubic time trend  
(4) 
FE +  
PKO only (5) 
      
Troop quality(t-1) -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01* -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
UN troops(t-1) -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.06** -0.06** -0.09*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
      
UN police(t-1) 0.32*** 0.41* 0.28** 0.44*** 0.24* 
 (0.08) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
      
UN observers(t-1) 0.01*** 0.004* -0.0003 -0.0004 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
      
Government conflict 0.38     
 (0.56)     
      
Population -0.61* -0.01 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.38*** 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) 
      
All battle deaths(t-1) 3.03*** 0.0018* 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.15 
 (0.74) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) 
      
All OSV dummy(t-1) 2.56*** 1.77** 1.82*** 1.78*** 0.85*** 
 (0.28) (0.55) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) 
      
Conflict duration -0.04 -0.01*** -0.01* -0.07* -0.03* 
 (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.03) (0.01) 
      
Conflict duration^2    0.02***  
    (0.005)  
      
Conflict duration^3    -0.0008***  
    (0.0002)  
      
Constant 11.02* 3.33 -6.65*** -6.75*** -8.04*** 
 (4.83) (3.47) (0.42) (0.43) (1.86) 
      
Alpha 2.40*** 2.10*** - - - 
 (0.18) (0.33)    
No. of observations 7,934 1,382 5,413 5,413 637 
No. of conflict episodes 70 17 47 47 21 
:DOGȤ2 499 176 1,506 1546 119 
Log-Likelihood -13,354 -3,481 -11,286 -11,261 -1,221 
      
 
SSSSRobust standard errors clustered on conflict. Government conflict drops out of 
Models 2 to 5 due to collinearity. 
 
 







Figure 3. Substantive effects of troop quality and troop size on civilian killings 
Left panel simulates an increase in troop quality measured as the weighted average expenditure measure per 
soldier in steps of USD 20 million. Right panel simulates an increase of troop size in steps of 5,000 soldiers. 
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Troop quality is not only a statistically significant predictor of reduced one-sided violence, 
but has also a substantively meaningful effect. Figure 3 plots the substantive effects of troop 
quality and troop size on one-sided violence against civilians. In the left panel of Figure 3, we 
simulate the effect of an increase by steps of USD 20 million per soldier on one-sided 
violence.11 If we move from zero to an average TCC spending per capita of 115 million USD 
the number of civilians killed is reduced from 21 to about 4. This corresponds to an over 90% 
reduction in civilian deaths as our troop quality measure increases from zero to 115.  
The right panel of Figure 3 simulates an increase in the number of peacekeeping troops. This 
allows us to compare the effect of troop quality and troop size on one-sided violence. We see 
that troop size has a slightly larger effect on the reduction of civilian victimization than troop 
quality.  
We can use our information about military expenditures of troop contributing countries to 
simulate the effects of a troop quality change in a given conflict-month. Consider, for 
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 We held all quantitative variables at their mean and set government conflict and lagged OSV dummy variables 
to 1. Both simulations in Figure 3 are based on Model 1 in Table II and were conducted in Stata 13 using Clarify 
(King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). 






instance, a hypothetical mission similar to the MONUC mission in the DR Congo in June 
2002. Our troop quality measure for MONUC in the DR Congo in June 2002 is around USD 
22.2 million weighted average military spending per soldier of all TCCs. In the simulated 
results of Figure 3, a troop quality measure of USD 22.2 million corresponds to about 15 
killed civilians per month. In June 2002 both the United Kingdom and France contributed five 
soldiers to MONUC. The bulk of the deployment was shouldered by troops from Uruguay, 
Mozambique, Senegal, and Ghana with relatively low military spending per soldier, thus 
contributing to the rather low troop quality measure of MONUC in that particular month. If 
we hypothetically add 1,000 troops by France and the UK respectively to that month and keep 
the deployments of all other troop contributing countries as they were, our troop quality 
measure almost quadruples to over USD 88.26 million. This corresponds to about five 
civilians killed, i.e. a drop of 10 civilian victims in comparison to the actual situation in the 
DRC in June 2002. This suggests that a substantial commitment by troop contributing 
countries with a better equipped military can substantively reduce the killing of civilians.  
The main problem to the robustness of our results from Model 1 stems from the non-random 
selection of the UN missions to which countries with better equipped military deploy their 
troops. We therefore follow Hultman et al. (2013) and Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) and 
reanalyze Model 1 on a matched sample and as well as with models that include both conflict-
fixed effects and mission-specific fixed effects.  
Matching allows us to create a dataset which includes only similar observations, but which 
differ with respect to whether a peace operation was deployed or not. Datasets pre-processed 
in such a way resemble fully-blocked experiments which compare a treatment (= deployment 






to peace operations) and a control (= no deployment to peace operations) group which are 
sufficiently similar but differ in their treatment status (Ho et al., 2006).12  
We include the covariates from Model 1 in Table II in our matching approach to explicitly 
model the selection of deployment to peace operations dependent on these covariates.13 Since 
we include measures of conflict intensity such as battle-deaths and a lagged dummy of 
whether one-sided violence occurred or not, we can systematically control for selection on 
conflict intensity variables. Diagnostic statistics reveal that the matching procedure increases 
balance between control and treatment groups (see Appendix E).  
Model 2 in Table II reports the results from an optimal matching without replacement, using 
the Mahalanobis distance between observations. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for troop quality in Model 2 provides further evidence for our hypothesis: if we 
compare conflict-months that are similar except for the fact that a peace operation was 
deployed or not, those months with higher quality missions deployed in the previous month 
see significant reduction in violence against civilians.14 The results from the matching 
analysis increase our confidence in the causal interpretation of the violence-reducing effect of 
higher-quality peace operations. 
A second source of potential bias comes from time-invariant variables, both on the level of 
the conflict and on the level of individual mission, which might drive the systematic 
                                                 
12
 This treatment choice reflects a trade-off. Matching is designed for binary treatments. However, the 
continuous nature of the troop quality variable makes it difficult to dichotomize it as a binary treatment without 
substantial loss of information. Thus, PKO presence²while controlling for troop size within operations to tease 
out the independent effect of troop quality²most reasonably reflects such a binary treatment while only 
imperfectly captures troop quality treatment. In an alternative approach, we dichotomize troop quality with 
varying cutoffs at lower, middle, and upper quartiles of the troop quality variable. Using the resulting dummy as 
treatment variable, our results do not substantively change, except when we use a 75% cutoff. This could 
indicate that increasing troop quality is most effective at lower levels, consistent with Figure 3. See Appendix E 
for details. 
13
 The Government Conflict dummy drops out due to collinearity. 
14
 We include the mission-specific covariates such as number of troops, police, and observers as well as the other 
covariates in Model 2 to account for any residual variance that remains after the matching procedure (Ho et al., 
2006). We nevertheless re-estimate Model 2 without covariates. The results do not substantively change (see 
Appendix E). 






deployment of troops to some peacekeeping operations and some conflicts but not to others, 
such as in the case of France and its former colonies. To account for such (and all other 
sources of) time-invariant heterogeneity, we reanalyze Model 1 using conflict-level fixed 
effects. The results are reported in Model 3 of Table II. Additionally in Model 4, we add a 
cubic time trend to the fixed effect specification of Model 4. The coefficient for troop quality 
becomes smaller, but remains negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
Model 5 of Table I we restrict our sample to observations in which a peacekeeping operation 
was deployed. This allows us to compare only conflict-months in which a peacekeeping 
operation was deployed, controlling for any factors that might drive the systematic selection 
of peace operations. Further, we include mission-level fixed effects in Model 5 of Table II, 
since time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across missions might systematically affect the 
deployment of troops to a mission. Even after accounting for mission-level fixed effects in the 
PKO-only sample, the effect of troop quality remains negative and statistically significant. 
We are therefore confident that our results are not biased due to adverse selection on 
observable or time-invariant unobservable factors. 
None of our control variables has a consistent and robust effect on the intensity of violence 
against civilians across all model specifications. The coefficient for population is negative in 
Model 1, but positive and statistically significant in the fixed effects specifications, indicating 
that a counterintuitive negative effect of population size in Model 1 is largely driven by 
between-country variation in population. The positive coefficient for population in the fixed 
effects models is in line with expectations: in highly populated countries, chances for civilian 
targeting increase. The lagged dependent variable is positive and significant, indicating serial 
correlation of civilian targeting over time, which is in line with the findings of Hultman et al 
(2013). 






Probing causal mechanisms 
Having established a general relationship between better troop quality and reduced targeting 
of civilians, we turn to an analysis of the underlying causal mechanisms proposed in our 
theory. Exploring causal pathways not only strengthens the credibility of our overall theory by 
testing additional observable implications, but allows us to interpret our results in a more fine-
grained manner and to better inform the policy debate.15 
Deterrence 
The first causal mechanism we propose is that better equipped peacekeepers are better able to 
deter combatants. A peacekeeping mission with better offensive and defensive capabilities 
and more professionally trained personnel poses a greater threat to perpetrators of violence 
against civilians than missions without these features. Deterrence can manifest itself through 
swift defensive or offensive actions in reaction to attacks against civilians, signaling 
SHDFHNHHSHUV¶ IXWXUH UHVROYH LQ VLPLODU VLWXDWLRQV 7KH LQWHUYHQWLRQ EULJDGH RI WKH 81
Peacekeeping mission in the DR Congo, for instance, was mandated as a direct reply to the 
ongoing violence against civilians and to break the persistent cycles of violence. But 
deterrence does not necessarily require prior civilian targeting. Peacekeepers can also deter 
civilian attacks by showing strength and presence²something that missions with newer 
equipment and more training should be better at than missions with less professional troops 
and frail machinery. In these ways, deterrence should prevent rebel and government forces 
from civilian targeting not only in the short-term, but also in the future.  
 
                                                 
15
 We report here only marginal effects and coefficient plots and refer to our supplementary appendix (section C) 
for detailed model results. 







Figure 4. Probing mechanisms I: Deterrence and long-term effects of troop quality 
Coefficient estimates with 90% (solid line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. "Reference month" is the 
OSV count in the month used in Model 1, Table 2. "1 month", "2 month" etc. refer to 1, 2, etc. month leads of 
the OSV variable. 
 
Empirically, deterrence thus implies a negative effect of troop quality on civilian targeting 
that persists over time. Our empirical strategy so far, however, has aimed to establish the 
relationship between higher score on our quality variable and levels of civilian targeting in the 
next month. From the resulting model setup (see Equation 2), we therefore cannot know 
whether the effect persists over time²it could be that the coefficients in Table II only 
represent a short-term dent in the level of one-sided violence in the next month while jumping 
back to conventional levels after that. To test for temporal persistence, we thus estimate 
Model 1 from Table II using varying leads of our dependent variable. The results are plotted 
in Figure 4. The µReference Month¶ coefficient represents the troop quality coefficient from 
Table II, whereas the other coefficients represent the relationship between troop quality and 
one-sided violence in future months. Consistent with our expectations, Figure 4 shows that the 
effect of troop quality persists over time. The association even becomes stronger for future 
levels of violence against civilians in the medium-term up until one year after the reference 
month. We take this as evidence that troop quality indeed shapes one-sided violence through a 
SHDFHNHHSLQJPLVVLRQV¶DELOLW\WRGHWHUDWWDFNV 







Figure 5. Probing mechanisms II: logistical advantage and rainfall 
Plot shows the conditional marginal effect of a one unit increase in our troop quality measure (=1 million USD) 
at varying monthly rainfall levels. The shaded area represents a 95% confidence band. The rug plot on the 
bottom of the x-axis shows the distribution of the rainfall variable. 
 
Logistics 
The second causal mechanism we put forward concerns the role of logistical advantage of 
high-quality peacekeeping troops. The UN often stresses the challenges posed by environment 
and weather conditions, such as rain seasons (Government Accountability Office, 2008: 52). 
This implies that the effect of high-quality troops should be particularly visible in 
environmentally harsh environments. WH XVH D FRXQWU\¶V PRQWKO\ UDLQIDOO OHYHOV WR
approximate severe weather conditions.16 We add an interaction term between monthly 
rainfall levels and our troop quality measure to Model 1 from Table II. We expect a negative 
sign of the interaction term which indicates a negative effect of troop quality on civilian 
                                                 
16
 Another potential variable that approximates difficult environmental conditions is mountainous terrain (Fearon 
& Laitin, 2003). This variable is time-invariant, however, and strips our monthly observations from much of the 
within-group variation, making the direct effect less interpretable. Nevertheless, in the appendix, we use 
mountainous terrain as variable to control for a potential omitted variable bias resulting from better equipped 
troops being systematically sent to logistically more difficult (= more mountainous) countries.  






targeting in particularly rainy seasons.17 Figure 5 plots the conditional marginal effect of troop 
quality at varying levels of rainfall. The relationship is negative as expected and is particularly 
strong in months characterized by heavy rainfall. We interpret this result as evidence that 
better equipped peacekeepers do indeed have a logistical advantage in environmentally harsh 
conditions when it comes to preventing attacks against civilians.  
Monitoring 
The third proposed mechanism states that high-quality peacekeepers are better able to monitor 
FRQIOLFW SDUWLHV¶ EHKDYLRU WKXV LPSURYLQJ WKH PLVVLRQ¶V FDSDELOLW\ WR UHVSRQG WR FLYLOLDQ
emergencies. We identified two channels through which monitoring might work: First, high-
quality peacekeepers have better means for communication through better access to more 
advanced communication equipment. Second, high quality peacekeepers enjoy diplomatic 
pressure by countries willing to deploy high-quality peacekeeping troops to a conflict.  
An additional empirical implication regarding the first monitoring channel²
communication²concerns the relationship between mission diversity and access to 
communication technology. Bove and Ruggeri (2016) have shown that mission diversity can 
play a beneficial role for reducing attacks against civilians. More diverse missions²measured 
through a troop fractionalization index that captures the range and diversity of countries that 
contribute troops to a peacekeeping force²EHWWHU FRPSOHPHQW HDFK RWKHU¶V FDSDELOLW\ DQG
increase their ability to observe misconduct. At the same time, more diverse troops can also 
induce coordination problems due to the large number of different actors involved. We argue 
that better equipment strengthens the positive impact of diversity and reduces the costs of 
coordination problems induced by mission diversity. To test this argument, we introduce an 
interaction term between mission diversity taken from Bove and Ruggeri (2016) and our troop 
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 Data on rainfall patterns is taken from Harris et al. (2014). We take the natural log and lag the rainfall variable 
by one month.  






quality measure of Model 1 from Table II, expecting a negative relationship that indicates a 
conditionally negative effect of troop quality and higher levels of mission diversity.18  
 
 
Figure 6. Probing mechanisms III: information and mission diversity 
Plot depicts the conditional marginal effect of a one unit increase in our troop quality measure (=1 million USD) 
at varying levels of Bove and Ruggeri's (2015) troop fractionalization measure. The shaded area represents a 
95% confidence band. The rug plot shows the distribution of the troop fractionalization measure 
 
Figure 6 does not show the expected effect, however. There is a statistically significant 
marginal effect of troop quality at low levels of fractionalization (between 0.25 and 0.5 on the 
fractionalization index score). Nevertheless, the effect is substantively very small and 
statistically insignificant over most of the range of the fractionalization variable. We therefore 
cannot rule out a null effect, questioning our confidence in a strong interpretation of this 
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 The model without interaction between troop fractionalization and troop quality also serves as an additional 
robustness check whether our results are not driven by the omitted variable of troop fractionalization, which they 
are not.  









Figure 7. Probing mechanisms IV: diplomatic pressure and government vs rebel OSV 
Coefficient estimates with 90% (solid line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. "Gov't OS\" refers to one-
sided violence perpetrated by the government only; "Rebel OSV" refers to one-sided violence perpetrated by the 
rebel side only 
 
Another implication follows from the second channel, diplomatic pressure: If troop 
contributing countries accompany their troop deployment with diplomatic actions targeted at 
reducing civilian killings, this effect should be visible in different effects on the perpetrators 
of one-sided violence. Specifically, we expect that high-quality troops should be more clearly 
associated with a decrease in OSV by the government side than by the rebel side. 
Governments are much more amenable to diplomatic pressure: they rely on foreign aid and 
the diplomatic support by TCCs in international organizations, and are thus more vulnerable 
to political and economic pressure by donor states.19 Furthermore, governments often prevent 
the international community to directly engage in diplomatic talks with rebel groups out of 
fear that this might legitimate insurgents. Also, governments are typically the direct 
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 In section G of the Appendix, we provide evidence that troop quality is indeed positively associated with 
foreign aid. 






FRXQWHUSDUWZKHQQHJRWLDWLQJSHDFHNHHSHUV¶UXOHVRIHQJDJHPHQW, which often also reflects the 
top-down, nation-level approaches of most UN peace operations (Autesserre, 2010). 
Splitting the OSV variable into rebel and government OSV, we find support for this 
expectation as reported by Figure 7. While there is a substantively stronger relationship 
between troop quality and OSV perpetrated by the government side, the effect becomes small 
and statistically insignificant for rebel violence only. This indicates support for the diplomatic 
pressure channel of our third causal mechanism.20  
Alternative explanations 
We have provided statistical evidence for the argument that better equipped and better trained 
peacekeepers from countries with higher military expenditures systematically reduce the level 
of one-sided violence against civilians and illustrated the causal channels through which this 
effect might run. There is a chance, however, that this pattern results from other factors that 
systematically drive both variation in peacekeeping troop quality and violence against 
civilians. We therefore conducted a series of robustness checks that we summarize here for 
brevity and present in more detail in the appendix. 
One challenge to our proposed mechanisms is that they implicitly assume that TCCs with 
high quality militaries are willing to both contribute and deploy their troops within PKOs. To 
account for the presence or lack of such political will we conduct a series of robustness 
checks. First, we include a control for the mean cumulative number of casualties to which a 
                                                 
20
 Figure 6 might seem to undermine our argument above: Logistical advantages and deterrence should also 
apply to OSV perpetrated by rebels²yet the small, insignificant coefficient for rebel OSV suggests that it does 
not. This interpretation is misleading, however. As we document in more detail in Figure C.1 in the Appendix, 
the seeming null finding for rebel OSV in Figure 6 masks different temporal dynamics of the effect of troop 
quality across OSV types. Figure C.1 shows that the effect of troop quality on Government OSV is visible 
immediately in the following months. The effect of troop quality on rebel OSV, however, manifests only after 
DERXWPRQWKV7KXVDPLVVLRQ¶VKLJKHUWURRSTXDOLW\LVPRUHHIIHFWLYHLQOLPLWLQJFLYLOLDQYLFWLPL]DWLRQ
immediately, suggesting that diplomatic pressure is a causal channel. Yet the statistically significant²albeit 
smaller²coefficients for rebel OSV after 2 months onward (as well as our findings for the interaction with 
rainfall above) also provide evidence in favor for the logistical and deterrence channels. 






mission¶s troop contributing countries were exposed since 1990. This measure should capture 
(at least to an extent) the risk-aversion of TCCs (in addition to the control variables for 
battlefield violence):21 a TCC that has suffered from many fatalities in prior peace operations 
might be more restrictive in its rules of engagement due to prior µbad experiences,¶ such as the 
United States after its participation in the disastrous UNOSOM II mission in Somalia in the 
early 1990s. Data for this measure is taken from the Peacemakers at Risk dataset (Bromley, 
2018). Second, we include a cumulative count of mission-specific casualties. Not only the 
TCC-specific experience of casualties might change deployment rules, but also the fact that 
peacekeepers have died on the very mission to which countries have deployed their troops. 
Data for this variable also comes from the PAR dataset. Third, we include a count of the 
number of TCCs that represent one of the P5 countries in the UN Security Council (UNSC). If 
our measure reflects only the impact of the PKO participation by powerful countries, the 
independent effect of troop quality should disappear after including this variable. In an 
alternative specification, we use the count of both P5 and non-permanent UNSC members. 
)RXUWKUHJLRQDOSUR[LPLW\PLJKWDIIHFWD7&&¶VSURSHQVLty to deploy troops within a mission. 
Conflicts in countries that are closer to a TCC imply higher security concerns than conflicts in 
far-away countries²which might trigger troop deployment. To control for this, we include a 
count of how many TCCs in a mission come from the same UN regional bloc as the mission 
country. Finally, some countries have very specific national deployment rules that are often 
historically determined. Swedish troops in the Malian MINUSMA mission, for instance, have 
stricter deployment caveats due to evacuation concerns than their Chadian counterparts. Our 
mission- and conflict-fixed effects models in Table II account for this to some extent (since 
many of these restrictions are of historical nature and thus time-invariant). Nevertheless, we 
include a count variable that captures how many European countries (including Japan) 
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 We are aware that this is only an imperfect indicator, as even risk-averse troops can be attacked.  






participated in the mission, with the expectation that if our result (and troop quality measure) 
is entirely biased by these deployment restrictions it should disappear once we control for this 
explicitly. In all model specifications (see Table D.1 Appendix), the coefficient for the troop 
quality proxy remains negative and statistically significant. We are therefore confident that 
our results are not driven by a systematic bias in the political willingness of TCCs to commit 
and deploy their troops to a PKO. 
Another SRVVLEOHDOWHUQDWLYHH[SODQDWLRQLVWKDWLWLVQRWWKHSHDFHNHHSHUV¶troop quality which 
leads to reduced OSV, but that both the presence of high-quality peacekeepers and lower 
levels of civilian killings are driven by a ceasefire between parties (Fortna, 2004). An 
additional potential source of bias is the type of mandate (Hultman, 2010). Two types of 
mandates might systematically affect our results: first, a mandate that allows for the use of 
military force (Chapter VII mandates) and/or a mandate that explicitly calls for the protection 
of civilians. Since TCCs with better equipped militaries might systematically shy away from 
deploying their troops to miVVLRQVZKHUHVROGLHUVPLJKWEHSXWLQWRKDUP¶VZD\WKHW\SHRI
PDQGDWH PLJKW EH GULYLQJ ERWK D PLVVLRQ¶V DYHUDJH troop quality DV ZHOO DV WKH PLVVLRQ¶V
ability to protect civilian from violence. Finally, deployment of better equipped troops to UN 
peace operations could also be affected by the presence of non-UN troops in the same country 
to a different mission that might or might not support the UN peacekeeping operation 
(Gaibulloev et al., 2015). Many Western countries choose to deploy their troops to peace 
operations²quite often, however, not under UN command, but either under their own 
command structure or in the context of an operation led by a regional organization, such as 
the European Union or NATO.  
Controlling explicitly for these variables does not substantially change our results (see 
Appendix D.2). We report the results of a series of additional robustness checks in the 






supplementary appendix. We test whether the effect of troop quality is robust to (1) an 
alternative measure of troop quality that only uses the weighted average of troop contributing 
FRXQWULHV¶ PLOLWDU\ H[SHQGLWXUHV LQVWHDG RI DOVR ZHLJKWLQJ E\ PLOLWDU\ SHUVRQQHO  WKH
exclusion of Sudan as potentially distorting case, (3) adding a measure of total UN mission 
expenditures22 (4) a model in which we include all variables presented in the previous section, 
including mission fixed effects, (5) varying time lengths of post-conflict periods and (6) 
excluding TCCs with less than 40 troops. Across these different specifications, our results 
remain largely stable: higher measures of troop quality are consistently associated with fewer 
civilian killings.  
Conclusion 
In this article, we demonstrate that troop quality of UN peace operations can reduce civilian 
victimization in internal conflicts. Well-trained troops with adequate equipment, high-quality 
intelligence, and diplomatic support from their troop donors are better able to deter violence 
from state and non-state actors, can reach remote and inaccessible locations, inflict higher 
costs to combatants who target civilians and have superior abilities in monitoring peace 
agreements than similar operations with troops that are less apt for peacekeeping tasks. These 
operational advantages translate into better capabilities to protect civilians. 
Our findings complement existing scholarship on peacekeeping operations by offering a more 
fine-grained explanation of their violence-reducing effect and to the puzzle why large or 
diverse peacekeeping troops are not always able prevent violence against civilians. Our 
evidence suggests that troop quality is a critical ingredient for successful peace operations, in 
addition to troop size and diversity.  
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 Since the UN compensates TCCs this variable ensures that our troop quality measure does not reflect UN 
mission expenditures. 






Future research should invest in better measures of mission capacity. While our proxy 
indicator has sufficient face validity and does relatively well capture the broad tendency of a 
PLVVLRQ¶V RSHUDWLRQDO FDSDFLW\ LW PLVVHV VSHFLILF QXDQFHV )RU LQVWDQFH ZH ODFN SUHFLVH
comparative and comprehensive information about training of forces, airlift capacity, vehicle 
quality, or intelligence capabilities, particularly when it comes to mission owned equipment. 
Another avenue for future research, particularly quantitative studies, is the decision-making 
process of TCCs to deploy specific types of troops to PKOs. Existing research has largely 
focused on why countries contribute troops to PKOs in the first place (Gaibulloev et al., 
2015). Why countries deploy certain kinds of troops with varying rules of engagement is less 
understood, however. In this article, we treat this question only as a source of bias for the 
relationship between troop quality and civilian protection. Yet we believe that putting 
deployment strategies front and center as well as PRUHGLUHFWPHDVXUHVRI3.2¶VRSHUDWLRQDO
capabilities holds much potential to better understand peacekeeping performance. 
Replication data  
Replication scripts, data, and the online appendix can be found at 
http://www.prio.on/jpr/datasets. All analyses were conducted in R 3.4.1 and Stata 13.1. 
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